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Symposium Presentation:
Legal Recognition of Digital
Signatures:
A Global Status Report
by
RICHARD ALLAN HORNING*
MODERATOR: Our next speaker is Richard Allan Homing.
He is Chair of the Internet Practice Group at Tomlinson Zisko
Morosoli & Maser LLP, in Palo Alto, California. He has
participated in numerous industry and legal conferences and
has published a number of articles on the subject of digital
signatures, which he is addressing today.
RICHARD HORNING: We collectively - the law firms in
Silicon Valley, and those that have offices here in San
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authored numerous articles on Internet law, "Contracting over the Internet" in
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Francisco's Multimedia Gulch - are working at the center of a
tremendous amount of significant economic activity.
We represent one of the founders of mySimon, which
developed an engine for comparison shopping searches.
MySimon was sold on Wednesday of this week to CNET, a
company headquartered here in San Francisco, for $700
million. So you can see there are some pretty big stakes in
the legal questions.
It is also the case that our clients are operating in
Internet time and they expect their lawyers to operate in
Internet time as well. Our firm happens to have one of the
main nodes of the Internet, operated by Netcom, in our
basement. However, I don't know that it's necessarily an
advantage, because while it probably gives us a little better
connectivity it also causes our e-mail in-boxes to fill a lot
faster.
I'm going to talk about digital signatures as they relate to
electronic commerce. Electronic commerce is really a
continuation of traditional commerce using new means of
communication and interaction. The buying and selling of
goods and services has been going on for millennia, but we
are now facing a phenomenon that's widely referred to as
"disintermediation." Basically, existing structures and
organizations for the distribution of goods and services are
being moved aside by virtual enterprises, such as click-and-
order enterprises. This leads to the need for new global legal
models.
The fundamental obstacle impacting the contracting
process in cyberspace goes back 350 years, to the Statute of
Frauds' adopted in England in 1677. The concept of the
Statute of Frauds, a concept which has been carried forward
in modem Western law, is that there should be some formal
recognition between contracting parties of the making of and
existence of their contractual relationship. The wise
legislators recognized this need in 1677 and said, "Put it in
writing and sign it." Lawyers and written contracts were the
result.
Move your attention forward a couple hundred years to
1844 and Samuel F.B. Morse's invention of the telegraph. The
telegraph caused quite a revolution in the way in which
1. 29 Car. II, Ch. 3 (1677).
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people communicated with one another.2 Questions in legal
circles inevitably arose, as businesses started using the
telegraph system to negotiate and form contracts. "Where's
the writing? Where's the signature when you send a
telegram?"
Let us fast forward to the era of computer aided
communication systems and networks. Various dates are
given for the birth of the Internet, and various individuals
and politicians have claimed founder status. The date I use,
April 7, 1969, is the date of the first Request For Comments,
or RFC. The RFC is the foundation or building block upon
which the engineers and technologists have moved this
technology forward. The first RFC was authored by a
graduate student at UCLA, Steve Crocker, now Dr. Steve
Crocker, a co-founder of Cybercash.
Since 1969 we have been living and working in what I
refer to as the modern era of contractual practice. E-mail,
web forms, EDI transaction sets, the "click here on the I
agree" button, and the click-wrap license, are all used to
create contracts.
The Uniform Commercial Code asks the question in
connection with the electronic formation of contracts for the
sale of goods, valued at $500 or more: "Where's the writing?
Where's the signature?" The UCC, adopted in 49 states,
requires a signed writing for every contract for the sale of
goods valued in excess of $500. Although the definitions of
the UCC are vintage 1960, through skill, foresight, and
intuition of the draftspeople the definitions of "signature" and
"writing" used in the UCC are rather flexible, and properly
interpreted the UCC should not cause a significant problem.
This is because "signed" is defined in the UCC as including
symbols adopted or used with an intent to authenticate, and
"writing" includes any intentional reduction to a tangible
form.
As we think about the need for a global legal model well
adapted to the Internet Era we should reflect briefly on why
the concept of a "signed writing" even developed.
First, there is the evidentiary value of having a
2. See generally TOM STANDAGE, THE VICTORIAN INTERNET: THE REMARKABLE
STORY OF THE TELEGRAPH AND THE NINETEENTH CENTURY'S ON-LINE PIONEERS
(1998).
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permanent embodiment of the transaction. A writing
produces this.
Second, we can see the value of the ceremony, which was
a major concept in 1677. We lawyers all remember the
concept of "livery of seisin" in connection with real estate
transactions from our course in Real Property - the
crumbling of some soil in the presence of the transferee as a
part of the ceremony where Blackacre changed hands.
Third, the affixing of a signature as indicating approval.
"By signing this document I acknowledge it as an agreement I
stand behind."
Fourth, clarity. Clarity arises from the very act of forcing
the contracting parties to express their intent in a written
document.
Fifth, finality. Finality is the notion that the signed
document embodies the final agreement of the parties
superseding all the unsigned drafts.
Sixth, the deterrence of doubtful transactions. This was a
primary reason in 1677 - if one reads the case law - to
having a writing requirement.
Finally, written documents provide an ease of negotiation.
This allows the creation of what have become known as
"negotiable instruments."
Few of us ever see what an e-mail message looks like
underneath Outlook or any other e-mail communications
program because Outlook and Eudora hide these
hieroglyphics from us. The hieroglyphics, however, tell us
information we need to know about an e-mail message to
have it admitted into evidence.
Using e-mail to form contracts gives rise to the familiar
legal question: "Where is the writing? Where is the
signature?"
We can display the image of the e-mail message on the
screen. We can capture it. We can save it. We can put it on
the hard drive. We can print it out and pass it around. Is this
a "writing"? If it is a writing, '%vhere's the signature?"
Here in the United States we can look to the case law
having to do with what is a signature, what is the function of
authentication, and how does it relate to the admission of
evidence for the answer to the question: can an enforceable
contract be created by the exchange of e-mail messages?
Looking at the case law, the legal concepts and requirements
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"signed," "authenticated," and "writing" will all be satisfied by
the presentation of that e-mail message into evidence at the
courthouse.
I published an article where I took a look at that case
law,3 concluding that the traditional autograph is not the sole
means by which the Statute of Frauds concept of a signed
writing can be satisfied. I was fortunate enough to have a
judge in Massachusetts recently agree with me.4 This notion
that an e-mail can satisfy the Statute of Frauds - that an e-
mail can be a substitute for a writing, a substitute for a
signature - leaves business people somewhat uncertain,
because there's no positive legislation. Business people are
not really confident that the Judge of the Superior Court in El
Paso, Texas is going to be familiar with how e-mail works,
and that he or she will instantly recognize that e-mail
message as being signed, in writing and admissible in
evidence.
Lawyers need to worry about e-commerce and its
requirements from the business perspective. Business people
want to know their trading partners. They want to know that
their communications are secure. They want to know that
their communications were received unaltered at the other
end. They depend upon trust and the ability to prove that the
parties all understand what is at stake. Business people want
to make sure that trust and reasonable consumer
expectations will be honored. Business people need to make
sure that record-keeping requirements exist such that the
records of the transaction will remain unaltered, so that when
those records are presented to the judge in El Paso the
necessary proof of the transaction will be there. Business
people need to trust that the payment methods are secure.
In the Internet era, how do we ensure that we can
demonstrate all of these things in court? Where is the
evidence? What should we be using as a modem-day
substitute for that symbol we have so long trusted - the
autograph on a piece of paper?
One of the solutions is the public-key encryption
3. Richard A. Horning, Has HAL Signed a Contract: The Statute of Frauds in
Cyberspace, 12 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 253 (1996).
4. See Doherty v. Registry of Motor Vehicles, (visited October 13, 2000)
<http://www.loundy.com/CASES/Doherty-vRMV.html>.
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infrastructure (PKI) and digital certificates. The RSA patent is
the foundational building block upon which the PKI
infrastructure is presently built. VeriSign is the leading
certificate vendor in the United States, indeed globally.
There are other technologies. PinOp is the principal
alternative technology. It is a biorhythmic technology that
involves creating an autograph, using a stylus on a pad, and
digitizing and encrypting the results, so that they can be
reproduced, stored in a secure fashion, etc.
When we look at encryption technology and the digital
signature system we see that the architecture is designed to
achieve a number of valuable results. These results are
valuable, in the sense that they can be used as a substitute
for the functionality of the autograph on paper system we
have long relied upon - the authentication of messages; the
identification of parties; ensuring the integrity of the content
of the message; ensuring the security of the transmission of
the message; time-stamping; date-stamping; and privacy.
These are the glorious benefits of encryption, subject, of
course, to the kinds of restrictions that our next speaker is
going to be talking about: the interference of the United
States Government in this process in the export control
context.
The arrival of the PKI infrastructure needed some legal
foundation. The ABA Section of Science and Technology Law
has a subcommittee, the Information Security Committee,
which wrote a report on digital signatures. 5 This report led to
the enactment of the first digital signature law in the United
States, in Utah.6 I've outlined the subjects which are
discussed in the Utah legislation. The important ones have to
do with (1) limitations on the reliance which recipients of
digitally signed messages may place on the digital signature;
(2) limitations on liability of the certificate authorities; and (3)
the rights and responsibilities of the key holders.
The Utah statute is keyed on the PKI infrastructure, and
does not take into account other alternative systems. The
PinOp system doesn't fit within the Utah model.
Other states have also gotten into the act. Illinois is one I
5. American Bar Association, Digital Signature Guidelines (promulgated
August 1 .1996) <http://www.abanet.org/scitech/ec/isc/dsgfree.html>.
6. UTAH. CODE .ANN. § 46-3-101 (1996).
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like to point to because it distinguishes between an electronic
signature (and says an electronic signature is just as good as
the autograph) and a digital signature. 7 There are thus two
levels of signatures that are contemplated by the Illinois law:
the difference between them is that when you use a digital
signature (the encrypted kind), you get something called
"non-repudiation."
In the context of an. autograph, or in the context of an
electronic signature, the burden of proof is on the proponent
of the admission of the signature into evidence. The question
in court is whether the proponent can demonstrate that this
is in fact Neil Bardack's "signature" on the document, and
that he "authored" the e-mail. The new Illinois law says that if
you use a digital signature (the encrypted kind), you can shift
the burden of proof to the recipient of the message. With the
shift of the burden of proof it is the recipient's responsibility
to prove "it wasn't me." This is one of the meanings of non-
repudiation.
Florida, the third model in the United States, took a
minimalist approach.8 Florida law recognizes electronic
signatures as having the same force and effect as a written
signature, and defines an electronic signature as symbols
manifested by electronic means with intent to authenticate a
writing. Florida also agreed to study what sort of system
ought to be used for digital signatures.
You can go to various web sites where you can see the
activity in each of the fifty States. 9 Some states have adopted
legislation limited to certain classes of commerce, while in
others the legislation is more broadly applicable.
All of this activity has led to a great push for the Uniform
Electronic Transactions Act (UETA), a uniform law that is
circulating in the United States. California was among the
first States to adopt the UETA.1 California's legislation
7. Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act, 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175
(1997).
8. Electronic Signature Act of 1996, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 282.70 et. seq.
(1997).
9. See, e.g., McBride, Baker & Coles, Legislation Authorizing Electronic
Signatures (visited October 13, 2000)
<http://www.mbc.com/ecommerce/legis/table0l.html>.
10. Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, CAL. Cw. CODE §§ 1633.1-1633.17
(West 2000).
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featured a number of variations on UETA's provisions which
caused California's law to diverge from the proposed national
model. Pennsylvania was the second State to adopt the UETA,
and it has gone word-for-word with the model."
Congress has now gotten into the act, with two bills
pending. Both have passed their respective chambers and are
in the Conference Committee. Both acts encourage the
enactment of the UETA, by saying in essence, "if you don't,
the Federal legislation will preempt what you do." The Federal
legislation basically says that contracts cannot be denied
legal effect because they are based on an electronic signature.
Congress will probably provide some exceptions for existing
legal structures such as the UCC, real estate transactions,
family law, health care, and some other specialized areas.
Congress is trying to push the States to get into the act, "get
off the dime," to create some uniformity in the legal system.
If you look at the various legislation that's been passed by
the States you can see why there is a need for uniformity.
Uniformity takes on a much larger role in the international
setting, where for a number of years UNCITRAL, a body of the
United Nations, has been promoting a Model Law on
Electronic Commerce and Draft Uniform Rules on Electronic
Signatures.' 2 One of the hallmarks of the Model Law is party
autonomy.
If Michael Scott and I want to set up an electronic
interchange system where we agree that the passage of
certain tokens between us in an EDI setting will bind us, the
UNCITRAL Model Law recognizes this as creating a legally
binding contract. That is party autonomy. In the old days
that agreement was a big thick document of specifications
that lawyers and technologists would put together.
One of the first countries to adopt digital signature
legislation, outside of the United States, was Germany.
Germany is probably one of the most restrictive legal regimes
in cyberspace in terms of "signatures." German law is a PKI
only scheme. The German legislation does not give any legal
effect whatsoever to electronic signatures, e-mails, etc. The
11. Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2260. 101 et. seq. (West 2000).
12. UNCITRAL, Model Law on Electronic Commerce (1996) (amended 1998)
<http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/electcom/ml-ec.htm>.
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traditional German legislation would not give recognition to
any electronic signatures, so if Neil Bardack and I were going
to undertake a transaction by e-mail in Germany, we'd be out
of luck in terms of getting legal recognition under traditional
German law. We would not fit in the structure of the German
digital signature law. Neither would my agreement with Mike
Scott to set up a mutual recognition agreement based upon
party autonomy.
The Utah law has a regime for the licensing of certificate
authorities. It's not nearly as rigid as the German one. The
philosophy in the United States, that has been put forward in
most of the States, is to let the market more or less decide,
with some minimal requirements on who should act as
certificate authorities.
The Germans, in contrast, have a very rigid regime. They
also have carved out a very major role for the government in
the process, in establishing technical standards. If you don't
meet the technical standards established by the German
government for the proper PKI infrastructure, you achieve no
legal recognition.
This is contrary to the attitude that prevails in the United
States. We believe that the Government, except for export
control, should stay out of the business of regulating
certificate authorities and digital signatures.
Mutual recognition of digital certificates issued by entities
in other countries is an important issue. This is not the case
in Germany, unless the country whose signature regime is
sought to be recognized has a legislative scheme which is
similar to the German scheme. There is no other country in
the world, except Singapore, which has adopted anything
close to the German style of legislation.
Fortunately for the commercial world, and fortunately for
the European community, the EU has gotten into the act with
a Directive. The official version went up on the Internet on the
January 19, 2000. Viewed from a US perspective, there is a
lot of regulatory content in the EU scheme. There is a lot
more oversight by governmental institutions, and there are a
lot more requirements built into the legislation.
Mention needs to be made of the issue of international
cross-recognition of digital signatures. If a signature is issued
in the United States under a certificate authority regime,
what recognition will be given in Europe to that certificate?
2000]
The European Directive makes provisions for this, but it's not
carte blanche. There are limitations and, under certain
circumstances, the member states are permitted to deny
recognition to- certificates issued outside the member
countries.
In Europe, party autonomy - the ability of Mike Scott and
I to enter into an agreement that says, "If you get a secret
decoder-ring symbol from my computer, it means that I'm
bound to the deal" - is going to continue to be dictated by
national law. So we have the possibility of a lot of local
variation across the European community depending upon in
which member state the parties are doing business. Even
though trading partners in closed systems agree with one
another that they're happy with party autonomy, when they
get to court they might fmd that the national legislation is not
so hospitable.
All of this led the United States to propose in 1997, in
UNCITRAL, the need for an international convention. The
U.S. said in essence: 'We need to get this into a treaty." The
proposal that the United States put forward places emphasis
on party autonomy. We like that kind of thing here in the
United States, the ability of parties to agree amongst one
another as to the circumstances under which they would be
bound.
Technology-neutral is a key part of the philosophy that is
going forward under the UETA regime, and in the recent state
legislation. We are getting away from sole reliance upon the
Utah model and the PKI infrastructure. The catch words are
now nondiscrimination against technologies, no use of
legislation or rules to create trade barriers, and the positive
obligation to give recognition to signatures.
As you can see there is a lot of work to be done before we
achieve the ultimate goal; the dream of e-commerce players,
people who are in the infrastructure business, people who are
in the business of buying/selling goods and services, the
eBay's of the world, and the eTrades of the world: the notion
that geographic boundaries have no place in cyberspace, that
we are ultimately an interconnected world. The legal system
needs to recognize that actors sitting in front of their
computer monitors, or connected wirelessly via a Palm Pilot
to this thing called the Internet, are communicating with
those who offer goods and services and ignoring the
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geographic boundaries which previously limited trade. This
creates the need for new legal models.
The legal system ought to promote the uniformity of
treatment of those transactions. The legal system ought not
stand in the way, ought not be a trade barrier based on
geographic boundaries and diverse legal regimes.
Unfortunately we are a long way from anything like
uniformity. We don't even have uniformity in the United
States. Now overlay that with relations with our major trading
partners, the kinds of things the Europeans are talking
about, and the input that the Germans have on the process.
All of this means there is important work yet to be done.
In the current environment, businesses who seek to
engage in what would classically be called international trade
(the supplying of goods and services to businesses and
consumers outside the physical boundaries of their host
nation-state) pursuant to electronically-formed contracts, are
assuming risks. They are assuming the risk that the
transactions in which they engage will be void, or voidable, at
the insistence of the person at the other end because they
cannot enforce the contract in court. Fixing this is the
challenge of electronic commerce.
20001
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